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ABSTRACT: The literature on the roles that governance/political and economic stability play to 
attract capital flows into African economies has been burgeoning. Good governance, liberalization, 
infrastructure, incentive packages have been regarded  as cures to break the deadlock to reverse 
the economic plight, to attract inflow of capital and, in some cases, to reverse outflows of African 
economies. The flow of capital, however, has undesirable side effects on host economies’ working 
conditions, environmental standard, inequality, and culture, among others. These economic and 
social external or negative spillover effects are due to the phenomenon of “race-to-the-bottom” 
where companies invest in economies with lax regulations and generous incentive packages. Given 
the highly expected significant economic impacts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and foreign 
aid in Africa,, it is becoming clear that the increased inflow of FDI and foreign aid may also have 
impacts on the political institutions and governance of a nation, especially for the case of 
economically low income African economies. However, these effects of capital flow on democratic 
institutions and governance of host economies have not been formally addressed. Using data on 
governance indicators, FDI, and foreign aid recently made available and other control variables, 
the present study explores whether FDI and foreign aid promotes or retards governance in African 
economies. Appropriate estimation techniques that take into account endogeniety in the data as 
well as heterogeneity of the sample countries are employed. The results of the study show that 
foreign aid (official development aid) has had immediate and persistent positive effects during the 
study period. Flow of FDI also has positive, though weak, effects on governance but with no 
persistent effect. Other forms of official flow, with less grant component, have both immediate and 
lag negative effects on governance in African economies.  
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Introduction 
 
Presence of democratic institution and good governance are an important input to attract more and 
genuine foreign and local capital. Especially at the early stage of a country’s development process, 
foreign investors are looking for stability and effective democratic institutions to invest in a host 
country. The role that democratic institutions, governance, and political and social stability plays to 
attract foreign capital has been the focus of the late 1980s and early 1990s empirical works. The belief 
that foreign capital inflows impose no influence on governance and democratic institution is fading. 
Anecdotal evidence shows presence of influence of big multinational firms that operate worldwide to 
have significant impact on small and economically weak states like those in Africa. The significance of 
this study for the case of African countries is paramount. The economic power of a small African 
country vis-a-visa a big multinational firm, who are the main foreign direct investors, is comparable for 
a company to have influential bargaining power. What is the role of capital flow on a country’s 
governance institutions? Is there a difference between the role of FDI and other forms of capital 
flow (official development aid other official capital flow)? Do these capital flows have lagged 
effects or only immediate contemporaneous effects? 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which capital flows of different forms have 
influence on governance and democratic institutions of African countries. The role that capital flows - 
foreign direct investment, official development aid and other official flows – play to fill savings gap is 
well documented and early development economics scholars have been promoting increased flow of 
such capital. Recently, scholars have shifted the gear and have been looking into the role that capital 
flows play in promoting or retarding governance in developing countries, although empirical works to 
substantial the claim is scarce, especially for developing African countries. This study attempts to fill 
this empirical gap. 
 
 
Literature Review: 
Most studies focus on the effect of democratic institutions and/or political instability on FDI. For 
instance, see the studies by Li and Resnik (2003) and Lemi and Asefa (2003). Li and Resnik’s (2003) 
develop a theoretical model to study this effect of domestic institutions on FDI. They conclude their 
study by saying that institutions affect FDI in a very complex manner. The complexity of the effect of 
institutions on FDI stems from the fact that increases in domestic democracy has a positive effect on 
FDI inflows because increases in democracy are associated with improved property rights. However, 
they also find that increases in democracy reduce the FDI received by these countries. They explain 
their conflicting findings by stating that while increased democracy helps the judicial system and rule of 
law, it also drives foreign investors away by imposing constraints on foreign capital and the host 
government. Similarly, Lemi and Asefa (2003), with focus on African states, address the same issue and 
show that there is differential effect of governance on different industries due to the nature, size and 
objectives of the FDI firms that enter African economies. The inclusive nature of the direct effect of 
FDI on democracy and the cautions placed on the interpretation of the results call for consideration of 
the reversal of cause and effect assumptions. Recently, the influence of capital flow on democratic 
institution has been getting attention as its influence seems apparent. As globalization in developing 
countries is gathering momentum, it is important to assess how democratization is being affected in 
this environment. This effect of globalization on domestic democratic institutions has been investigated 
by many theoretical as well as empirical studies.  
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However, the studies have not come to a consensus on the effect of globalization. The key 
globalization components considered in most of these studies are flows of capital as well as goods and 
services. Li and Revuney (2003) categorize the findings of these studies into three groups. One category 
finds that globalization enhances democracy while the second group finds the opposite; the third group 
however finds that globalization does not affect democratic institutions. Due to these conflicting 
findings, Li and Revuney (2003) investigate the effect of four national aspects of globalization on the 
effect of democracy for 127 countries during the period 1970 – 1996 by using a pooled time-series 
cross sectional statistical model. They find that two out of the four national aspects of globalization, 
namely, trade openness and portfolio investment inflows erode the prospects for democracy. On the 
other hand, the other two aspects of globalization, FDI and the spread of democratic idea flows, 
affects democracy positively. Huntington (1991) confirms this finding by asserting that global 
economic integration helps in the diffusion of democratic ideas which in turn lead to domestic 
democratization. Contrary to Li and Revuney’s (2003) findings, Rudira (2005) by using a sample of 59 
developing countries claims that trade and capital flows will be associated with enhanced democratic 
rights if social groups receive sufficient compensation for their (potential and actual) losses. His 
findings challenge popular views that the globalization automatically guarantees greater political 
freedoms. He also claims that it is invalid to assume that the expansion of democratic rights in the least 
developed countries (LDCs) necessarily preceded globalization.  
On the other hand, some studies have questioned how globalization affects domestic political power. 
Berger (2000) focuses on studies that use international trade theory to derive political models used for 
observing the links between globalization and institutions. One of the most important predictions of 
these political models is that globalization shrinks the power and sovereignty of the nation. This 
prediction stems from two arguments, one being the notion that the magnitude and velocity of 
international economic exchanges erode the state’s capabilities. The other is the argument that the 
extension of market relations across national borders diminishes the citizen’s attachment to national 
authority, leading to a decline in the legitimacy of central governments. He argues that the spread of 
neoliberal doctrines, an outcome of globalization, has reduced the legitimacy of state involvement in 
the economy as well as reducing the government’s ability to shape or change market outcomes.  
Although, the literature on the impact of globalization on domestic institutions is vast, there is only one 
study that we are aware of analyzing the effect of capital flow - in the form of official development aid, 
other official flows - on the domestic governance of African economies. The study by Goldsmith 
(2001) looks into how foreign aid influences statehood in Africa. The present study is different from 
Goldsmith’s (2001) in that the later covers only foreign aid where as this study looks into three 
different components of capital flow including foreign aid. The sample size, and governance indicators 
and methodology are also different. We employ larger sample, more advanced methodology as well as 
improved governance indicator.  
For purpose of comparison, it is important to look into these forms of capital flows, especially for the 
case of African economies not only due to the sheer size of the flow of these components but also the 
power they have vis-a-vise the economic power of individual African economies. The purpose of this 
study is to fill this empirical gap. Using data on political indicators and foreign aid recently made 
available, our study explores whether FDI and foreign aid promote or retard governance in African 
economies.  
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Methodology and Data 
 
Flow of capital is intertwined with other major macroeconomic variables and governance of a country. 
Depending on the types and forms of capital flow, foreign capital may correlate with financial, 
exchange rate, prices, interest rate, GDP and governance, among others, of a host country. Direct 
investment and foreign aid are slow flows and pose less risk on the stability of a country’s financial 
system compared to portfolio flows. On top of this, official flows (grant or market based) as opposed 
to private flows create less impact on financial instability, as they are not entirely driven by market 
forces. As these capital flows influence domestic market performance, their influence may also 
correlate with other major macroeconomic variables. In addition, countries or investors who send 
money to recipient countries look into the performance – initial conditionality and governance- of the 
economy to commit to the official flow of capital. Such interrelation between the flow of capital and 
other macroeconomic and governance indicators call for appropriate technique to account for the 
endogeniety of the variables of interest. A study that looks into the link between capital flows and 
governance variables does not escape the problem of endogenity.  
 
Sample countries are drawn from Africa over the period 1975-2002. These sample countries have 
differences in history, culture, governance, and size. Given the panel nature of the data with such 
heterogenous countries as a sample, correction for group-wise heterogeneity of the data is warranted. 
Hence, appropriate estimation technique should be used to account for the problems for the 
robustness of the results.  
 
It is difficult, if not impossible to account for all estimation problems at once in one estimation 
technique. However, it is appropriate to correct for each of these problems one at a time and compare 
the results from each estimation technique. This is because one of the problems may be the source of 
the other problem in estimation. To this effect, three different estimation techniques are employed 
here. The first one is heterogeneity corrected generalized least square to account for the group-wise 
heteroscadasticity of error terms. The second technique is simple instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
that account for only endogenity of some of the variables in question. The last approach accounts for 
both problems at once, robust instrumental variable estimation, which takes into account both 
heterosckedaticity and endogenity. 
One of the nice features of the last estimation technique is that it allows test for the validity of the 
instruments used. Specifically, it allows a test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen-Sargan Test) and 
likelihood ratio test of whether the equation is identified.  The first test confirms validity of the 
instruments used and the second test confirms that the excluded instruments are irrelevant. Both tests 
are performed for the last specification and results are presented along with the regression coefficients. 
  
The general form of the estimation equation is as follows: 
 
)var , ( iablesrol flow, cont official FDI, otheraidforeignfgovernance   
 
Three components of capital flow are considered: foreign aid-measured by official development aid 
(ODA), foreign direct investment (FDI), and other official flows (OOF). The control variables used in 
the estimations are those variables believed to have influence on governance and the operation of 
democratic institutions of a country. These variables are income (gross domestic product per capita), 
debt burden (debt service ratio to national income), dependency ratio (number of dependents per 
working population), and adjusted national saving (education expenditure per national income). Greater 
per capita income, and higher adjusted national savings are believed to promote democracy, as these 
are the key economic indicators that forms the building block of democratic institutions of a country. 
On the other hand, international dependency (measured by debt burden) and domestic dependency 
(measured by dependency ratio) are believed to retard democracy by weakening the power of the 
government both internationally and domestically.  
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The instruments used in the estimation of IV models are labor, export, import, gross capital formation, 
telephone mainlines, and polity. These instruments are believed to affect the flow of the components 
of capital considered in this study. Not only flow of market based capital flows (FDI and to some 
extent OOF) but also flows with large grant component (ODA) are also influenced by these control 
variables. The first stage results of the IV models are not reported here, but are available on request. 
  
Apart from the assumption of contemporaneous – immediate- effects of capital flow on democratic 
institutions, it is also logical to assume that there may be lag effects from these capital flows on the 
governance and democratic institutions of a country. To this effect, lagged values of the three capital 
flows (LAGODA, LAGFDI, LAGOOF) variables are used instead of the contemporary variables to 
see if there is any lag effect. Two different lag effects are considered: one-year lag and three-year lags. 
Results of the lag effects are presented in Appendix.   
 
For all the three different estimation techniques, similar approach is employed. First, all the three 
capital flow components are placed in one equation to see their simultaneous effects  Later, to see the 
separate individual effects, for each capital flow components separate equation is estimated using single 
capital flow component and all other control variables. The same approach is followed for lag effect 
estimation.   
 
Data  
 
Sample countries are drawn from Africa based on availability of data on capital flows, other major 
development indicators, and governance (democratic institution) indicators. Forty-four countries are 
selected, and the study covers the period 1975-2002. Capital flow variables are drawn from UNCTAD, 
Handbook of Statistics, CD-ROM 2003. The other development indicators that are used as control 
variables are obtained from World Bank, World Development Indicators.  
 
Three capital flow components are considered: Official Development Aid (ODA), Other Official 
Development Flow (OOF) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). ODA is official aid with more than 
25% grant component, whereas OOF are official flows with less than 25% grant component. See the 
appendix for detailed explanation of the variables. Table 1A in appendix presents the descriptive 
statistics of the model variables.   Descriptive statistics of the model variables show significant 
variations among countries of the region. The mean values of the model variables for each country for 
the years 1975-2002 is presented in the table. DEMOC variable that ranges from 0 to 10, is close to 10 
for Mauritius and close to 0 for Congo Republic, Egypt, Gabon, Libya, Rwanda, and Swaziland. The 
mean value of debt service ratio to national income ranges from over 14% for Angola and below 1% 
for Rwanda.  
Ratio of FDI inflow to GDP ranges from over 22% for Central African Republic to less than 1% for 
Nigeria, South Africa, Togo, Egypt, and others. Ratio of ODA to GDP also ranges from over 47% for 
Guinea-Bissau to less than 1% for Libya and Algeria. Ratio of other official flow is highest for Gabon 
(17.7%) and lowest for Guinea (less than 1%). 
 
 
Results 
 
Estimation results of the contemporaneous effects are presented in Tables 1-3 below. The results for 
the lagged effects are presented in Appendix Tables A.1 – A.3. Table 1 below presents the results for 
heteroscadeasticity adjusted GLS (Generalized Least Square) estimation. Where as Tables 2 present 
results for instrumental estimation with out heteroscedasticity correction and Table 3 presents IV 
estimation with correction for heteroscedaticity. The contemporaneous and lagged effects results are 
similar with slight difference for FDI flows. In each table, four estimation results are presented.  
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The first result is for estimation that uses all the three capital flow components at once. The other three 
estimation results are for the three components of capital flows (ODA, FDI, and OOF) estimated 
separately. The fitness test of the three models reveal that the specification is acceptable by the 
standard test statistics indicated in the tables. For the heteroscedasticity corrected GLS and IV models, 
wald tests show the significance of coefficients in almost all specifications. For the robust IV 
estimation, tests for instrument relevance (Anderson Canonical LR test) and equation identification 
(Hanson-Sargan test) are presented. In almost all specifications, the former test confirms the relevance 
of the instruments as indicated for each specification, whereas the later test fails to support the validity 
of the instruments. It is understandable that in IV models getting the right instruments is one of the 
major problems. 
  
The results show that official development aid (ODA) has significant positive effect on governance in 
African economies. This result holds in all alternative estimation techniques employed. The lag effect 
results also confirm the contention that the effects of ODA persists even after the commitment is 
made. The result confirms that the effect persists up to three years. Other forms of official flows 
(OOF), on the other hand, have significant negative effect. This is a complete opposite to ODA. 
Official flows with less grant component help deteriorate democracy in Africa or help keep autocrats in 
power. The lag effects also support the same view, in that OOF has negative lag effects up to three 
years in negatively affecting democratic institutions in Africa. 
 
 
Table 1. Heteroscedasticity corrected GLS: Dependent Variable is Democracy 
 
                           |All Flows|   ODA   |    FDI  |  OOF    
 
Official Development Aid   |      3.006***|      2.330** |              
|               
                           |    (3.964)   |    (3.247)   |              
|               
Other Official Flows       |     -1.271***|              |              
|     -0.985*** 
                           |   (-4.362)   |              |              
|   (-3.674)    
FDI inflow                 |     -0.172   |              |     -
0.022   |               
                           |   (-0.662)   |              |   (-
0.091)   |               
GDP Per Capita             |      0.055** |      0.050** |      
0.056** |      0.036*   
                           |    (3.016)   |    (2.788)   |    
(3.154)   |    (2.190)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |     -0.024   |     -0.027*  |     -
0.021   |     -0.021    
                           |   (-1.868)   |   (-2.079)   |   (-
1.566)   |   (-1.715)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |      0.003   |      0.007   |     -
0.066   |     -0.023    
                           |    (0.081)   |    (0.181)   |   (-
1.411)   |   (-0.618)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |     -2.723***|     -2.519***|     -
2.435** |     -2.941*** 
                           |   (-4.148)   |   (-3.955)   |   (-
3.085)   |   (-4.939)    
Constant                   |      2.952***|      2.705***|      
3.160***|      3.578*** 
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                           |    (4.490)   |    (4.219)   |    
(4.042)   |    (6.189)    
 
Number of Observations     |    863.000   |    938.000   |    
914.000   |    921.000    
Chi2                       |   88.70657   |   54.55733   |   
38.89038   |   70.95273    
Log Likelihood             |  -1841.264   |  -1988.534   |  -
1991.418   |  -1944.684    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-
values.   
 
 
The control variables have rather mixed results. Some of them have signs consistent with the a priori 
expectations, while others have different signs and level of significance for different specification. Two 
of the four control variables (GDP per capita and age-dependency ratio) have, for most specifications, 
the expected signs. GDP per capita has positive and significant effect on democracy. As stated earlier, 
income can serve as one of the necessary conditions to promote democracy. On the other hand, age-
dependency has negative and significant effects in most specification, which confirms earlier assertion 
that high level of domestic dependence hinders progress towards democracy.  
 
The other two control variables, debt burden, and adjusted saving (share of education expenditure) do 
not have the expected signs and the results are not consistent from specification to specification. One 
would expect that debt burden, measured by the share of debt service to income to impede progress 
towards democracy however, for two of the four specifications the variable has positive and significant 
effects, which is contrary to expectation. Adjusted saving has the expected sign for all specification 
except two. It has significant positive effect on governance in Africa.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Instrumental Variable Estimation: Dependent Variable is Democracy 
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* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-
values. 
 
 
Table 3. Robust Instrumental Variable Estimation: Dependent Variable is Democracy 
                        |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |   OOF    
 
FDI inflow                 |      5.934** |      3.856*  |              
                           |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |       
OOF    
 
FDI inflow                 |     -1.721   |      9.175*  |              
|               
                           |   (-1.030)   |    (2.348)   |              
|               
Official Development Aid   |     16.547***|              |     
53.046***|               
                           |    (3.499)   |              |     
(9.675   |               
Other Official flows       |    -36.863***|              |              
|    -23.471***           
                           |  (-10.638)   |              |              
|     (-6.156)          
GDP Per Capita             |      0.185***|      0.021   |      
0.454***|      0.048    
                           |    (5.744)   |    (0.444)   |    
(9.668)   |    (1.097)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |      0.095***|      0.011   |     -
0.202***|      0.034    
                           |    (4.482)   |    (0.369)   |   (-
5.390)   |    (0.994)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |      0.027   |     -0.185   |      
0.472***|      0.565**  
                           |    (0.318)   |   (-1.188)   |    
(3.447)   |    (2.861)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |      3.774** |     -5.719*  |     -
1.088   |      0.331    
                           |    (2.745)   |   (-2.404)   |   (-
0.607)   |    (0.125)    
Constant                   |     -3.370*  |      6.959** |     -
7.144***|      0.286    
                           |   (-2.215)   |    (2.845)   |   (-
3.316)   |    (0.105)    
 
Number of Observations     |    823.000   |    823.000   |    
859.000   |    824.000    
Overall R2                 |   .2149993   |   .0075333   |   
.0673959   |   .0153206    
Between R2                 |   .3071627   |   .0866117   |   
.0627174   |   .0948789    
Chi2                       |   175.5945   |   12.36344   |   
129.1035   |   48.26318    
Model P-value              |   1.66e-34   |   .0301333   |   
3.69e-26   |   3.14e-09    
Rho                        |   .3318205   |   .5174088   |          
0   |   .1837187    
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|               
                           |    (3.155)   |    (2.366)   |              
|               
Official Development Aid   |      2.718   |              |    
142.933** |               
                           |    (1.598)   |              |    
(2.836)   |               
Other Official Flows       |     -0.150   |              |              
|    -20.649*** 
                           |   (-0.248)   |              |              
|   (-3.771)    
GDP Per Capita             |      0.027   |      0.025   |      
0.705*  |     -0.020    
                           |    (1.473)   |    (1.399)   |    
(2.310)   |   (-0.336)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |     -0.015   |      0.014   |     -
0.756*  |     -0.005    
                           |   (-0.666)   |    (0.574)   |   (-
2.499)   |   (-0.082)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |     -0.519***|     -0.520***|      
0.470   |      1.002**  
                           |   (-3.346)   |   (-3.487)   |    
(0.736)   |    (2.708)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |     -3.991***|     -2.623*  |      
1.391   |      9.555*   
                           |   (-3.846)   |   (-2.299)   |    
(0.170)   |    (2.283)    
 
Number of Observations     |    776.000   |    822.000   |    
859.000   |    824.000    
F Statistics               |      8.789   |     10.430   |      
1.734   |      3.024    
Prob>F                     |      0.000   |      0.000   |      
0.124   |      0.010    
Hanson J statistics        |    154.145   |    186.956   |      
7.210   |     57.402    
P-value                    |      0.000   |      0.000   |      
0.027   |      0.000    
Identification LR test     |     14.216   |     13.964   |     
14.206   |     25.822    
P-value                    |      0.014   |      0.016   |      
0.003   |      0.000    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-
values. 
 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has positive, but weak, effect on governance and its effect is not 
persistent like the other two forms of capital flows. FDI is driven by market forces, as opposed to the 
other two forms of capital flow, which makes it less influential in the area of governance.  
It is also true that the flow of FDI is so low compared to ODA and OOF to have a significant and 
persistent influence on governance. The result confirms that if there is any effect from FDI on 
governance, it is positive. This result supports the view that market based flows of capital are in favor 
of democratic institution that guarantee property right and efficient government institutions. Unlike the 
results for the other two forms of capital flow, there is no evident to support lagged influence from 
FDI on governance in African economies. This positive effect of FDI on governance may not refute 
the view that FDI flows more to economies with lax regulation and standards, which has little to do 
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with the quality of governance and democratic institutions. However, the result refutes the contention 
that FDI flows to a country with bad governance to manipulate the official to secure monopoly and 
oligopoly power.  
 
One of the implications of the results is that ODA, compared to OOF is good to promote democracy. 
Are the difference between the two only the grand component or there is something else that 
differentials the two. The fact that the later has less grant component also imply less control by donors 
to trace the destinations and the actual uses of the money. What makes OOF different from FDI is 
that it may not be based on market forces and mostly it is through bilateral agreement between 
countries for friendship or security reasons. These kinds of official flows may have negative implication 
for democracy since there is no strict accountability for this.   
 
The results of this study do not support of refute the highly believed view among scholars that foreign 
aid does not promote economic development. But it sheds light on the fact that official development 
aid can prepare the ground work by improving governance and democratic institutions, which in turn is 
believed to promote economic development.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The fact that official development assistance (ODA) has significant positive effects on good 
governance in African economies is interesting. These results should be qualified by pointing out that 
whether ODA may enhance or retard democracy may depend on the type of assistance, how it is 
delivered, and its composition. It is quite possible for aid to promote democracy, if it is targeted to 
education, training, civil society groups such as women’s groups, and effective NGOs. It also depends 
on whether basic accountability and transparency are present in the governance of the country 
receiving aid.  
 
The results of this study also show the impact of FDI on governance is positive, though weak. This 
result is less surprising since governments may have incentives to attract FDI by improving their 
efficiency and accountability. A significant and sustained FDI is also one of the best ways of promoting 
economic growth and reducing poverty. In this regard, East Asia’s success in promoting poverty 
reducing economic growth is due to its ability to attract FDI. Africa today receives the least proportion 
of FDI of all developing regions of the world, and it is the single region with greatest increase in 
poverty.  In African economies where 70 % of the population on the average is currently in agriculture, 
massive investment in agriculture, especially in the areas of agro-processing industry is crucial. For 
these countries to attract significant FDI to agriculture and agro-processing industries, it is important 
that private citizens have a secured property right including land rights. 
 Africa needs to grow the private sector rapidly to promote employment, independence of government 
or civil service employment. It is not apparently clear why other official flows (OOF) has consistent 
negative effects on governance in Africa. Compared to the other forms of capital flow, it seems that 
African democratic institutions and the effecting functioning of governance is persistently eroded by 
the inflow of this forms of official inflow. One needs to investigate further the type, purpose, and 
terms of these forms of capital inflow to know the core of the problem. Given the aggregate nature of 
the dataset used, it is not possible to see the nature of the flow in more detail. Future research should 
look into the details of each flow to understand the issue even better.   
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Appendix: Data 
Capital flows from UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, CD-ROM, 2003 
 
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA): Grants or loans to developing countries that 
are undertaken by the official sector with the promotion of economic development and welfare as the 
main objective at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25%). 
 
OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWS (OOF): Transactions by the official sector with developing countries. 
OOF is flow which do not meet the conditions for eligibility as OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE or OFFICIAL AID, either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or 
because they have a GRANT ELEMENT of less than 25%. 
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI): is a private investment made to acquire or add to a 
lasting interest in an enterprise in a country on the DAC List of Aid Recipients. “Lasting interest” 
implies a long-term relationship where the direct investor has a significant influence on the 
management of the enterprise, reflected by ownership of at least 10% 
of the shares, or equivalent voting power or other means of control. In practice it is recorded as the 
change in the net worth of a subsidiary in a recipient country to the parent company. 
IMPORTS: Imports of goods and services in millions of dollars 
EXPORTS: Exports of goods and services in millions of dollars 
Development Indicators from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product of a host country (constant 2000 US$) 
GDP per Capita (GDPPC): GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)  
Gross Capital Formation per GDP (GCFPGDP): Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP of the host country 
Total Debts Service (TDEBTS): External debt Service as a percentage of GDP 
Telephone Main Lines - Mobile phones (per 1,000 people) 
Adjusted Savings - education expenditure (% of GNI) 
Dependency Ratio - Age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age population), population with 
age 0-14 divided by working age population, 15-64. 
 
Governance Indicators from datasets complied by Marshall and Jaggers (2003) and 
Freedom House, Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings 1972-73 to 2002-2003). 
Democracy: Indicator of the degree of institutionalized democracy, rating ranges from 0 to 10. 
Autocracy: Indicator of degree of institutionalized autocracy, rating ranges from 0 to 10. This is 
opposite of democracy. 
Civil Liberty: Indicator for civil liberty (including freedom of speech and expression of views and free 
press). Rating ranges from 0 to 7. 
Political Right: Indicator of political right (including freedom of expression of political views). Rating 
ranges from 0 to 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1A. Descriptive Statistics of model variables 
COUNTRY ADJSAV DEPRATIO TDEBTS DEMOC AUTOC CIVILL POLITICALR 
Algeria 4.940 0.859 10.514 0.393 6.714 5.643 5.964 
Angola 4.833 0.967 14.294 0.273 6.182 6.464 6.571 
Benin 3.153 0.995 2.217 2.667 3.889 4.750 4.893 
Botswana 5.127 0.945 2.129 7.786 0.000 2.536 1.857 
Burkina Faso 2.194 1.057 1.425 0.593 5.037 4.571 5.286 
Burundi 3.262 0.942 2.709 0.136 6.136 6.179 6.643 
Cameroon 2.565 0.911 4.781 0.393 6.786 5.679 6.250 
Central African 2.624 0.862 1.736 1.786 4.429 5.321 5.500 
Chad 1.352 0.969 1.017 0.350 5.000 5.786 6.429 
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Congo, Dem. Rep. 1.407 0.983 3.010 0.000 8.882 5.286 6.036 
Congo, Rep. 6.371 0.951 11.749 1.111 6.000 6.250 6.536 
Cote d'Ivoire 6.080 0.914 12.317 0.385 7.500 4.821 5.857 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 4.151 0.744 4.952 0.000 6.036 4.964 5.321 
Ethiopia 3.023 0.907 2.409 1.000 5.625 6.000 6.071 
Gabon 2.672 0.748 7.745 0.000 6.778 5.000 5.429 
Gambia, The 3.025 0.809 6.463 5.107 1.786 3.607 3.679 
Ghana 2.775 0.931 5.160 1.731 4.077 4.500 4.929 
Guinea 1.971 0.918 4.457 0.286 5.929 5.750 6.536 
Guinea-Bissau 2.501 0.847 4.576 1.346 5.269 5.500 5.250 
Kenya 5.911 1.042 7.912 0.643 5.679 5.214 5.571 
Lesotho 4.830 0.827 2.683 2.000 5.250 4.500 4.714 
Libya 2.137 0.827 . 0.000 7.000 6.536 6.571 
Madagascar 2.357 0.917 4.118 3.259 3.556 4.786 4.000 
Malawi 3.174 0.973 6.070 2.179 6.143 5.464 5.143 
Mali 2.704 0.980 2.622 2.630 4.148 4.821 5.000 
Mauritania 4.631 0.903 10.354 0.000 6.571 5.857 6.429 
Mauritius 3.657 0.565 7.380 9.750 0.000 2.179 1.714 
Morocco 4.781 0.795 8.960 0.000 7.500 4.679 4.464 
Mozambique 3.803 0.888 3.597 1.929 5.036 5.607 5.321 
Namibia 8.235 0.909 . 6.000 0.000 2.929 2.143 
Niger 2.522 1.067 4.436 1.778 4.815 5.357 6.000 
Nigeria 1.854 0.934 6.512 2.154 4.346 4.464 5.071 
Rwanda 3.196 1.016 0.912 0.000 6.444 5.821 6.429 
Senegal 4.011 0.921 5.859 2.429 3.107 3.857 3.857 
Sierra Leone 2.373 0.869 5.289 0.435 6.261 5.143 5.214 
South Africa 6.508 0.718 3.305 7.692 1.885 4.357 3.714 
Sudan 2.385 0.838 1.252 0.889 6.296 6.143 6.071 
Swaziland 4.709 0.895 3.229 0.000 9.643 5.036 5.643 
Tanzania 2.500 0.964 3.471 0.679 5.536 5.357 5.571 
Togo 4.699 0.934 5.799 0.385 5.462 5.607 6.250 
Tunisia 5.468 0.723 8.069 0.357 6.179 4.857 5.714 
Uganda 2.736 1.025 2.810 0.769 4.692 5.000 5.321 
Zambia 3.283 0.965 12.229 1.821 5.643 4.643 4.643 
Zimbabwe 6.115 0.987 5.808 2.148 4.407 4.964 5.036 
Total 3.711 0.903 5.367 1.756 5.129 5.065 5.278 
Variable: ADJSAV (adjusted saving- education expenditure to national income), DEPRATIO (dependency ratio), TDEBTS 
(debt service per national income), DEMOC (institutionalized democracy), AUTOC (institutionalized autocracy), CIVILL 
(civil liberty), POLITICALR (political right), FDIINF (FDI inflows), TODAOA (total official development aid), TOOF (total 
other official flows), RFDIINF (ratio of FDI inflow to GDP), RTODAOA (ratio of ODA to GDP), RTOOF (ratio of OOF 
to GDP). * all values are in millions of dollars. 
 
 
 
Table 1A. Continued 
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COUNTRY FDIINF TODAOA TOOF RFDIINF RTODAOA RTOOF 
Algeria 134.540 212.959 376.152 0.003 0.005 0.092 
Angola 165.537 199.115 18.196 0.029 0.031 0.037 
Benin 154.547 169.393 6.822 0.082 0.110 0.052 
Botswana 85.725 96.700 7.319 0.026 0.050 0.043 
Burkina Faso 110.288 291.070 1.142 0.053 0.160 0.011 
Burundi 113.303 150.993 0.392 0.176 0.218 0.010 
Cameroon 140.267 340.630 82.326 0.018 0.047 0.118 
Central African 204.493 125.300 0.996 0.226 0.156 0.013 
Chad 108.231 168.226 0.313 0.092 0.151 0.002 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 85.139 338.533 136.374 0.016 0.050 0.181 
Congo, Rep. 126.364 126.496 47.041 0.044 0.051 0.194 
Cote d'Ivoire 100.107 434.248 99.522 0.011 0.049 0.132 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 54.321 2126.522 287.885 0.000 0.041 0.055 
Ethiopia 294.216 613.926 4.981 0.057 0.152 0.015 
Gabon 36.227 74.589 67.085 0.005 0.019 0.177 
Gambia, The 80.624 58.522 0.989 0.094 0.207 0.047 
Ghana 14.429 415.796 12.041 -0.001 0.118 0.039 
Guinea 9.452 215.226 0.237 0.015 0.133 0.001 
Guinea-Bissau 39.499 84.681 0.571 0.197 0.478 0.035 
Kenya 80.062 539.633 -0.741 0.009 0.068 0.023 
Lesotho 61.340 89.500 7.758 0.094 0.170 0.121 
Libya 47.512 9.552 11.147 0.001 0.001 0.015 
Madagascar 73.594 290.033 23.263 0.021 0.091 0.080 
Malawi 62.546 301.604 2.696 0.041 0.233 0.040 
Mali 97.610 332.382 3.437 0.041 0.195 0.023 
Mauritania 79.566 210.441 8.244 0.086 0.333 0.169 
Mauritius 58.453 39.744 2.707 0.018 0.018 0.028 
Morocco 45.616 598.593 220.633 0.002 0.026 0.103 
Mozambique 65.260 630.030 39.342 0.017 0.314 0.130 
Namibia 22.124 119.165 2.380 0.003 0.042 0.008 
Niger 26.100 258.222 -1.307 0.016 0.171 0.003 
Nigeria 21.830 135.519 204.648 0.001 0.004 0.084 
Rwanda 5.857 267.889 1.500 0.003 0.190 0.010 
Senegal 77.104 451.641 25.144 0.029 0.147 0.100 
Sierra Leone 61.790 108.259 1.659 0.072 0.131 0.012 
South Africa 52.176 421.222 181.000 0.000 0.003 0.015 
Sudan 89.992 542.222 52.078 0.013 0.081 0.091 
Swaziland 93.222 37.330 3.433 0.132 0.048 0.069 
Tanzania 124.360 798.726 17.030 0.028 0.137 -0.013 
Togo 158.504 122.919 9.678 0.150 0.122 0.109 
Tunisia 120.651 235.548 163.022 0.009 0.022 0.134 
Uganda 89.228 405.867 0.256 0.041 0.138 0.013 
Zambia 132.558 499.311 17.515 0.043 0.169 0.069 
Zimbabwe 119.388 261.326 31.411 0.020 0.045 0.057 
Total 88.608 317.126 48.995 0.047 0.119 0.067 
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Table A.1. Heteroscedasticity correted GLS with Lags: Dependent Variable is Democracy 
                           |All Flows| ODA     |     FDI |  OOF    
 
One Year Lag of ODA        |     -8.887***|     22.130***|              |               
                           |   (-3.645)   |   (11.467)   |              |               
One year lag of OOF        |    -38.722***|              |              |    -40.048*** 
                           |  (-21.473)   |              |              |  (-26.022)    
One year lag of FDI        |     56.428***|              |     55.857***|               
                           |    (9.752)   |              |   (11.156)   |               
GDP Per Capita             |      0.221***|      0.171***|      0.063***|      0.241*** 
                           |   (13.549)   |    (8.571)   |    (3.733)   |   (19.580)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |      0.075***|     -0.018   |     -0.008   |      0.067*** 
                           |    (6.618)   |   (-1.678)   |   (-0.782)   |    (5.342)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |      0.012   |     -0.063   |     -0.056   |      0.012    
                           |    (0.366)   |   (-1.766)   |   (-1.431)   |    (0.336)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |      1.665** |     -3.636***|     -3.222***|      0.891    
                           |    (2.624)   |   (-5.815)   |   (-4.452)   |    (1.292)    
Constant                   |     -0.180   |      1.200   |      2.775***|      0.507    
                           |   (-0.295)   |    (1.811)   |    (3.830)   |    (0.767)    
 
Number of Observations     |    812.000   |    812.000   |    812.000   |    812.000    
Chi2                       |   935.3368   |   163.0154   |    158.124   |   1379.166    
Log Likelihood             |  -1571.669   |  -1649.863   |  -1692.301   |  -1596.872    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
 
 
Three years lag 
                           |All Flows|   ODA   | FDI     | OOF 
 
Three Years Lag of ODA     |      1.401   |     21.324***|              |               
                           |    (0.503)   |   (10.156)   |              |               
Three years lag of OOF     |    -30.657***|              |              |    -35.926*** 
                           |  (-13.892)   |              |              |  (-21.183)    
Three years lag of FDI     |     32.516***|              |     50.660***|               
                           |    (4.721)   |              |    (8.596)   |               
GDP Per Capita             |      0.235***|      0.164***|      0.065***|      0.221*** 
                           |   (12.142)   |    (7.664)   |    (3.607)   |   (15.892)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |      0.040** |     -0.024   |     -0.028*  |      0.035*   
                           |    (2.646)   |   (-1.834)   |   (-2.069)   |    (2.300)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |      0.011   |     -0.072   |     -0.065   |      0.049    
                           |    (0.247)   |   (-1.773)   |   (-1.399)   |    (1.130)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |      0.243   |     -3.650***|     -2.836***|     -0.027    
                           |    (0.338)   |   (-5.473)   |   (-3.749)   |   (-0.037)    
Constant                   |      0.150   |      1.460*  |      2.709***|      1.377    
                           |    (0.214)   |    (2.039)   |    (3.539)   |    (1.909)    
 
Number of Observations     |    732.000   |    732.000   |    732.000   |    732.000    
Chi2                       |    502.032   |   139.3392   |   102.0151   |   993.0181    
Log Likelihood             |  -1489.106   |   -1519.56   |  -1552.383   |  -1503.549    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2. Instrumental Estimation with Lags: Dependent Variable is Democracy 
 
                           |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |   OOF    
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One year lag of FDI        |      1.181   |      0.181   |              |               
                           |    (0.899)   |    (0.137)   |              |               
One Year Lag of ODA        |      5.100***|              |     79.906***|               
                           |    (4.224)   |              |    (8.300)   |               
One year lag of OOF        |      0.199   |              |              |    -25.173*** 
                           |    (0.333)   |              |              |   (-4.813)    
GDP Per Capita             |      0.041   |      0.012   |      0.629***|      0.026    
                           |    (1.316)   |    (0.384)   |    (8.136)   |    (0.490)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |     -0.014   |     -0.003   |     -0.123*  |      0.073    
                           |   (-0.793)   |   (-0.161)   |   (-2.412)   |    (1.835)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |     -0.094   |     -0.105   |      0.371*  |      0.716**  
                           |   (-0.907)   |   (-1.048)   |    (1.994)   |    (2.866)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |     -5.039***|     -4.848***|      0.287   |      1.707    
                           |   (-3.333)   |   (-3.299)   |    (0.109)   |    (0.531)    
Constant                   |      5.887***|      6.499***|    -12.824***|     -1.381    
                           |    (3.745)   |    (4.231)   |   (-3.822)   |   (-0.410)    
 
Number of Observations     |    786.000   |    799.000   |    915.000   |    836.000    
Overall R2                 |   .0961757   |   .0864114   |    .050654   |   .0060261    
Between R2                 |   .2288421   |   .1775603   |   .0352129   |   .0509911    
Chi2                       |   37.28201   |   16.15664   |   85.75954   |   30.13171    
Model P-value              |   4.15e-06   |   .0064108   |   5.22e-17   |   .0000139    
Rho                        |   .5137054   |   .6065315   |          0   |   .3009666    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
 
Three years lag 
                           |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |  OOF    
 
Three years lag of FDI     |     11.337   |     33.039   |              |               
                           |    (0.989)   |    (1.359)   |              |               
Three Years Lag of ODA     |      7.574***|              |     69.616***|               
                           |    (3.803)   |              |    (9.560)   |               
Three years lag of OOF     |      1.256   |              |              |    -28.461*** 
                           |    (0.686)   |              |              |   (-5.767)    
GDP Per Capita             |      0.029   |     -0.029   |      0.522***|      0.097*   
                           |    (0.449)   |   (-0.189)   |    (7.045)   |    (1.972)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |     -0.028   |     -0.026   |     -0.060   |      0.105*   
                           |   (-0.787)   |   (-0.339)   |   (-1.415)   |    (2.206)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |      0.047   |      0.312   |      0.470*  |      0.413*   
                           |    (0.232)   |    (0.585)   |    (2.409)   |    (2.013)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |     -4.426   |     -3.419   |      2.592   |      0.238    
                           |   (-1.591)   |   (-0.496)   |    (0.645)   |    (0.076)    
Constant                   |      4.325   |      3.341   |    -13.961** |      1.031    
                           |    (1.421)   |    (0.438)   |   (-3.018)   |    (0.328)    
 
Number of Observations     |    730.000   |    744.000   |    820.000   |    784.000    
Overall R2                 |   .0052361   |   .0001972   |   .0753374   |   .0177146    
Between R2                 |   .0339205   |   .0050847   |   .0462698   |   .1546738    
Chi2                       |   20.60571   |   2.644171   |   105.5773   |    43.0989    
Model P-value              |   .0043997   |   .7546431   |   3.52e-21   |   3.53e-08    
Rho                        |   .7208976   |   .7402082   |   .0897255   |   .1183882    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
 
 
Table A.3. Robust Instrumental Estimation with Lags: Dependent Variable is Democracy 
 
                         |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |  OOF    
 
One year lag of FDI        |     -0.697   |     -0.340   |              |               
                           |   (-0.721)   |   (-0.298)   |              |               
One Year Lag of ODA        |      3.898*  |              |    125.917***|               
                           |    (2.499)   |              |    (3.782)   |               
One year lag of OOF        |     -1.022   |              |              |    -18.490*** 
                           |   (-1.723)   |              |              |   (-3.935)    
GDP Per Capita             |      0.037   |      0.020   |      0.636** |     -0.018    
 18 
                           |    (1.951)   |    (1.095)   |    (3.279)   |   (-0.426)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |      0.014   |      0.013   |     -0.195   |      0.002    
                           |    (0.529)   |    (0.487)   |   (-1.829)   |    (0.027)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |     -0.391*  |     -0.464** |      0.496   |      0.808**  
                           |   (-2.447)   |   (-2.909)   |    (0.780)   |    (2.856)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |     -1.174   |     -2.585*  |      3.232   |      7.380*   
                           |   (-1.017)   |   (-2.231)   |    (0.546)   |    (2.150)    
 
Number of Observations     |    786.000   |    798.000   |    873.000   |    835.000    
F Statistics               |      6.161   |      7.049   |      3.172   |      3.669    
Prob>F                     |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.008   |      0.003    
Hanson J statistics        |    197.072   |    182.140   |      7.478   |     89.664    
P-value                    |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.024   |      0.000    
Identification LR test     |     27.355   |     27.167   |     26.867   |     21.615    
P-value                    |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.001    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
 
Three years lag                           
                         |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |   OOF    
 
Three years lag of FDI     |      5.204   |      9.776***|              |               
                           |    (1.337)   |    (3.439)   |              |               
Three Years Lag of ODA     |      9.793***|              |     83.658***|               
                           |    (5.239)   |              |    (7.085)   |               
Three years lag of OOF     |     -0.370   |              |              |    -26.396*** 
                           |   (-0.496)   |              |              |   (-3.842)    
GDP Per Capita             |      0.039   |      0.015   |      0.427***|     -0.046    
                           |    (1.853)   |    (0.763)   |    (4.658)   |   (-0.644)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |     -0.002   |     -0.005   |     -0.085   |      0.007    
                           |   (-0.080)   |   (-0.162)   |   (-1.558)   |    (0.097)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |     -0.165   |     -0.255   |      0.531   |      0.822*   
                           |   (-0.979)   |   (-1.470)   |    (1.438)   |    (2.057)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |     -2.166   |     -1.704   |      3.371   |     12.137*   
                           |   (-1.658)   |   (-1.307)   |    (1.001)   |    (2.221)    
 
Number of Observations     |    729.000   |    743.000   |    820.000   |    783.000    
F Statistics               |      9.676   |      8.481   |     10.474   |      3.526    
Prob>F                     |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.004    
Hanson J statistics        |    156.829   |    175.031   |     11.669   |     50.828    
P-value                    |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.003   |      0.000    
Identification LR test     |      6.347   |      8.186   |     75.950   |     21.336    
P-value                    |      0.274   |      0.146   |      0.000   |      0.001    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
